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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.MARIELLE LeBOUTHILLIER, 
and DENISE, GISELE, YICTOR 
and SUSANNE LeBOUTHILLI-
ER, minors by their Guardian ad 
Litem, ELAINE K. \VOOD, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
GLORIA OLIVER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SHlJRTLEFF & ANDRE\VS, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Third Part,:; 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
PETER KIE1VIT CONSTRUC-
TION CO., MORRISON-KNUD-
SON, INC., and MID-YALLEY. 
INC., doing business as ARCH DA~I 
CONSTRUCTORS, 
Third Partv Defendants 
and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' PETITION 
FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
1 
No. 
10363 
Come now Gloria Oli,·er and ~Iarielle LeBouthillier 
' 
and Denise, Gisele, Yictor and Susanne LeBouthillier 
' 
minors, by their Guardian ad Litem, Elaine K. Wood, 
and move for a rehearing in the above-entitled matter 
upon the ground that this court erred as a matter of 
law: 
(I) In affirming the decision of the lower court; 
( 2) In failing to consider or rule upon the very 
issue on appeal; 
( 3) In rendering its decision after obtaining a 
stipulation that the matter would be considered by 
Mr. Justice Tuckett, when .Mr. Justice Tuckett did 
not participate in the decision; and 
( 4) In usurping the function of the jury in this 
cause and thereby denying appellants their constitu· 
tional right to a jury trial, depriving appellants of due 
process of law and equal protection of the laws under 
the Utah and Federal Constitutions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are as stated by the court in its opinion 
and substitute opinion filed herein, with the following 
serious omissions from said opinions: The case was 
submitted to the jury on a special verdict and special 
interrogatories, and the jury made findings as follows: 
"I. 'Vas the accident in question an unavoid· 
able accident, as that has been defined for you in 
these instructions? 
2 
Answer: No. 
2. ,,Vas the defendant, Shurtleff & Andrews, 
negligent in the following situation: 
(a) In failing to exercise that degree of care 
which a reasonably prudent lessor of a 
crane would do under all of the circum-
stances of this case prior to its delivery 
to the lessee, to inspect the crane for any 
defects which might be so discovered and 
to repair the same before delivering it to 
the lessee, Arch Dam Constructors, so 
that it would be safe to use by and around 
its employees? 
Answer: Yes. 
If your answer is YES then answer the fol-
lowing: 'Vas such negligence of the defendant 
Shurtleff & Andrews a proximate cause of the 
accident? 
Answer: No. 
3. Was it the reasonable intendment of the 
parties that the obligation to repair found in 
paragraph 7 of the lease (Exhibit D-27) should 
include an obligation of the lessee, Arch Dam 
Constructors, to exercise such care as a reason-
ably prudent lessee of a crane would do under 
all of the circumstances of this case to remove 
the }ib from the boom to inspect the 'ears' at 
such time or times as may have been necessary 
to make an.IJ needed repairs? 
Answer: Yes. 
If .11our answer to the foregoing question is 
YES then answer the following: 
(a) Did the Arch Dam Constructors fail to 
3 
exerc~e the d1dy so undertaken by them 
under the agreement? 
Answer: Yes. 
If your answer to (a) is YES then answer the 
following: 
(b) TfT as such failure a proximate cause of 
the ac,cident? 
Answer: Yes. 
4. 'Vhat amount of damages do you find, if 
any, that would reasonably compensate Gloria 
Oliver for the loss she has sustained? 
$68,000.00 
5. 'Vhat amount of damages do you find, if 
any, that would reasonably compensate Marielle 
LeBouthillier and the children for the loss thev 
have sustained? · 
$150,000.00" (R. 88, 89). 
The opinions make no reference to any findings 
other than the first two findings. The other findings 
are crucial to the result and cannot be ignored. The 
opinions state that: "On the other hand, there was evi-
dence in the record from which a jury could reasonably 
have found that the unfamiliarity of the operator as· 
signed that day by Arch Dam Constructors to work 
on the crane with a 'special power' lever which required 
manual centering, might, because of incorrect opera· 
tion, have caused the jib to fall backward." Appellants 
concede this statement of fact, but it becomes utterly 
immaterial in view of the jury's total findings as set 
forth above, and particularly m view of the jury's 
answers to Interrogatory No. 3. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE OPINIONS OF THE COURT COM-
PLETELY IGNORE THE FINDINGS O:F 
THE JURY. 
The crux of the court's opinions is that appellants 
complain of the error of a certain instruction given 
and are therefore entitled to relief. The court concedes 
that the instruction "might be error", but concludes 
that it is not prejudicial. This utterly ignores the 
precise and only issues on appeal, to wit: 
( 1) Did the jury, s finding that the employer's 
(Arch Dam,s) failure to discover the defect was a proxi-
mate cause of the accident preclude, as a matter of law, 
the claim of a superseding cause, ta wit: operator neg-
ligence? 
( 2) Did the jury, s finding that the employer, s 
(Arch Dam,s) failure to discover the defect was a proxi-
mate cause of the accident necessarily result in the neg-
ligence of def end ant to discover the same defect a 
proximate cause of the accident, as a matter of law, 
entitling plaintiffs to judgment? 
The answer by all authorities cited in the briefs 
on file herein, none of which are discussed or considered, 
is overwhelmingly yes. The only importance of the 
erroneous instruction is that it clearly directed the jury 
to answer the interrogatory regarding the proximate 
cause of the defendant's negligence as it did. This was 
the prejudice of the instruction. 'Vhat can be more 
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prejudicial than erroneously directing a jury to make 
a particular finding? But, be that as it may, it is not 
the heart of the matter. Irrespective of the erroneous 
instruction, the findings of the jury entitled appellants 
to judgment, or, at the very least, a new trial. 
This court, in failing to pass upon the vital issues, 
utterly ignores long standing Utah law as set forth 
in Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah 110, 138 P.2d 639. 
As a matter of fact, the opinions fail to consider any 
issue before the court except that an erroneous in· 
struction by the trial court may be considered non-
prejudicial in the opinion of this court-not the problem 
presented. 
Our law is clear that when facts are submitted 
on special interrogatories, the court shall enter judg· 
ment after applying appropriate legal conclusions to 
the facts as found. Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co., 
8 Utah 2d 383, 335 P.2d 619. The trial court refused 
to apply appropriate legal conclusions to the facts as 
found by the jury, and this court fails to consider, 
discuss or decide said legal conclusions. 
The jury found: ( 1) Shurtleff & Andrews was 
negligent in delivering a defective crane; (2) That 
this negligence was not a proximate cause of the acci· 
dent (having been erroneously directed to so find); 
(3) That Arch Dam was negligent in failing to dis· 
cover the defect; (4) That Arch Dam's negligence was 
a proximate cause of the accident; ( 5) That the plain· 
tiffs were damaged in the total sum of $218,000.00. 
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The only legal conclusions resulting from said 
findings are: ( 1) That if Arch Dam's negligence in 
failing to discover the defect was a proximate cause, 
Shurtleff & Andrews' negligence in failing to discover 
the same defect was a proximate cause (Ehalt v. Mc-
Carth.11, supra; Schweitzer v. Stone, 13 Utah 2d 199, 
371 P.2d :.WI); (2) That the jury found that Shurtleff 
& Andrews' negligence was not a proximate cause 
because the court directed them erroneously that if 
Arch Dam's negligence was a proximate cause, Shurt-
leff & Andrews' negligence could not be a proximate 
cause ( Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co. 
(1965), 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33) ; (3) That if 
Arch Dam's negligence was a proximate cause, opera-
tor conduct could not be the superseding cause which 
lw law is the sole cause (Elwlt v. ft'IcCarthy, supra) .1 
POINT II. 
APPELLANTS I-IA VE BEEN PREJU-
DICED I~ THIS COURT BY APROCEDURAL 
IRREGULARITY, ENTITLING THEM TO A 
REHEARING. 
The above case was argued before five justices 
of this court on November 12, 1965, and the matter 
thereafter remained under advisement by the court 
for a period of seven months. Upon the death of Mr. 
1 In addition. the court failed to consider, dis~uss or rule upon 
the issues of breach of warran1ies, which issues the trial court 
erroneously refused to submit to the jury. 
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Justice 'V ade, the Chief Justice called counsel for 
appellants and inquired whether counsel desired to 
reargue the case before the court, including the newly 
appointed ~Ir. Justice Tuckett, or submit the matter 
to the court, including Mr. Justice Tuckett, upon the 
record and the briefs and the transcript of the prior 
oral argument. Counsel indicated that he would like 
to listen to the prior oral argument, and the Chief 
Justice assented and arranged for the hearing of same. 
Thereafter, all parties entered into a written stipulation 
on file herein waiving further argument before Justice 
Tuckett and stipulating that .Mr. Justice Tuckett could 
participate in the decision upon the basis of the record, 
the briefs, the exhibits and the transcript of the oral 
argument. Mr. Justice Tuckett does not participate 
in the decision of the court. Certainly, had appellants 
been apprised of this, they would have elected to re· 
argue the case as per the invitation of the Chief Justice. 
There is no doubt that three justices may hear and 
decide matters submitted to this court, but having 
argued the matter before five justices, and then having 
been given the option to reargue the matter before a 
newly constituted court, appellants are entitled to the 
consideration of this most important problem by the 
new court. The matter involves the future of two widows 
and four children. The trial took a full week. The jury 
deliberated at great length. The briefs on appeal are 
extensive. This court, prior to the death of Mr. Justice 
Wade, deliberated for seven months. For the court, 
thereafter, to dispose of the matter with less than the 
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full court and without deciding the very issue before 
the court seems to appellants to constitute error and 
fundamental lack of fair play. 
Good cause for reargument is shown where a case 
is not argued because of the suggestion of a justice 
of the appellate court that an argument is not necessary. 
Equitable 11rust Co. v. Madsen, 132 N.Y.S. 316. 
POINT Ill. 
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO APPLY 
APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS TO THE 
SPECIAL FINDINGS OF THE JURY 
tTSURPS THE JURY'S FUNCTION AND DE-
PRIVES APPELLANTS OF THEIR RIGHT 
TO JURY TRIAL, THEREBY DEPRIVING 
THEM OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS AS 
PROVIDED BY THE UTAH AND UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTIONS. 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, §IO, provides: 
"In capital cases the right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general juris-
diction, except in capital cases, a jury shall con-
sist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior juris-
diction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. 
In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may 
find a Yerdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived 
unless demanded." 
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It has been argued that it is uncertain whether or not 
the right to trial by jury in Utah is guaranteed in a 
civil case. See Vol. 8, Utah Law Review, No. 2, "Right 
to Civil Jury Trial in Utah: Constitution and Statute", 
by Ronan E. Degnan. 
Irrespective of the ultimate answer to this issue, 
the right to a jury trial through Utah's history has 
existed by statute, and at the time of the trial of this 
cause existed both by statute and court rule. See Rule 
38 (a), Utah Rules of CiYil Procedure, which provides: 
"Right PreserYed. The right of trial by jury 
as declared by the Constitution or as given by 
statute shall be presened to the parties." 
See also 78-21-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The 
plaintiffs herein demanded a jury, and the case was 
tried before a jury, and the matter was submitted to 
a jury which made findings entitling plaintiffs to judg· 
ment, or, at the very least, a new trial before another 
jury. The trial court and this court both refuse to allow 
the jury findings to control, but take the findings from 
plaintiffs as though the matter had never been tried 
before a jury. 
Plaintiffs concede that when there is no dispute 
that a particular fact is not supported by any evidence. 
the court may make this conclusion and either direct 
a verdict or take a verdict away from a jury. That, 
however, is a far cry from the situation herein. The 
jury made findings on each and every material fact, 
and the findings must be treated in one of the two 
10 
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following manners: ( 1) They are so inconsistent that 
a new trial must be ordered; or ( 2) They are consistent, 
and a judgment should be entered. 
The court's refusal to consider the consistency or 
inconsistency of the finding~ amounts to a refusal to 
consider the findings themselves, and this the court can 
do only where the facts undisputedly show that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to relief. See Raymond v. Union 
Pacific Railroad, 113 Utah 26, 191 P.2d 137, where Mr. 
Justice '"'" olfe says: 
"It has been strenuously argued by plaintiff 
that this decision has deprived him of his consti-
tutional right to a jury trial. That contention 
has been urged upon this court in almost every 
case of nonsuit and directed verdict brought be-
fore us. This court is charged with the duty of 
protecting all of the rights of all litigants. This 
is especially true of those fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the State and Federal Constitu-
tions. But the right to have a jury pass upon 
issues of fact does not include the right to have 
a cause submitted to a jury in the hope of a 
verdict where the facts undisputably show that 
the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." 
See Creamer v. Ogden Union Railway & Depot 
Co., 121 Utah 406, 242 P.2d .575, where Mr. Justice 
Henriod says: 
"As to plaintiff's contention that denying re-
covery here denies him a constitutionally guar-
anteed jury trial, answer is found in the lan-
guage of Mr. Justice "\V olfe in a case decided 
by us and in decisions of the U. S. Supreme 
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Court, to the effect that no such deprivation 
occurs where the facts indisputably establish no 
right to relief.'' 
The result of the trial and appellate courts' refusal 
to consider all of the findings of the jury deprives 
plaintiffs of their existing right to a jury trial resulting 
in fundamental lack of fair play, a violation of the Due 
Process and Equal Protection of the Law Clauses 
of the United States Constitution (Article XIV, Sec-
tion 1, Amendments) and the Utah Constitution 
(Article I, Sections 7, l 0) . 
The United States Supreme Court has passed 
upon this situation of fundamental unfair play on a 
number of occasions. In Ba.r;ham v. Pennsylvania Rail-
road, 372 U.S. 699,10 L.ed 2d 80, 83 S.Ct. 965, the court 
stated: 
"Only when there is a complete absence of 
probative facts to support the conclusion reached 
[by the jury] does a reversible error appear. But 
where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for 
the jury's verdict, the jury is free to discard or 
believe whatever facts are inconsistent with its 
conclusion. And the appellate court's function is 
exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes 
apparent, it being immaterial that the court 
might draw a contrary inference or feel that 
another conclusion is more reasonable." 327 U.S. 
at 653. 
In Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 
281 U.S. 672, 74 L.ed 1107, the court stated: 
" * * * The federal guaranty of due process 
extends to state action through its judicial, as 
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well as through its legislative, executive, or ad-
ministrative, branch of government. 
It is true that the courts of a state have the 
supreme power to interpret and declare the writ-
ten and unwritten laws of the state; that this 
court's power to review decisions of state courts 
is limited to their decisions on federal questions; 
and that the mere fact that a state court has 
rendered an erroneous decision on a question 
of state law, or has overruled principles or doc-
trines established by previous decisions on which 
a party relied, does not give rise to a claim under 
the 14th Amendement or otherwise confer ap-
pellate jurisdiction on this court. 
But our decision in the case at bar is not based 
on the ground that there has been a retrospec-
tive denial of the existence of any right or a 
retroactive change in the law of remedies. We 
are not now concerned with the rights of the 
plaintiff on the merits, although it may be ob-
served that the plaintiff's claim is one arising 
under the Federal Constitution and, consequent-
ly, one on which the opinion of the state court 
is not final; or with the accuracy of the state 
court's construction of the statute in either the 
Laclede Land & Improv. Co. Case or in the 
case at bar. Our present concern is solely with 
the question whether the plaintiff has been ac-
corded due process in the primary sense, -
whether it has had an opportunity to present 
its case and be heard in its support. Undoubt-
edly, the state court had the power to construe 
the statute dealing with the state tax commis-
sion; and to re-examine and overrule the Laclede 
Land & Im prov. Co. Case. Neither of these 
matters raises a federal question; neither is sub-
1~ 
ject to our revie\Y. But, while it is for the state 
courts to determine the adjective as well as the 
substantive law of the state, they must, in so 
doing, accord the parties due process of law. 
'Vhether acting through its judiciary or through 
its legislature, a state may not deprive a person 
of all existing remedies for the enforcement of 
a right, which the state has no power to destroy, 
unless there is, or was, afforded to him some real 
opportunity to protect it." 
Recently, in April of 1962, the United States Su-
preme Court in Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. 
Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 7 L.ed 2d 798, 
82 S. Ct. 780, the jury in a negligence suit made find-
mgs as follows: 
"I. 'Vas unseaworthiness a substantial factor 
in causing the injuries to the plaintiff? 
Yes. 
2. 'Vas there negligence on the part or Eller-
man Lines, Ltd. [Defendant}, which was a sub-
stantial factor in causing injuries to the plaintiff? 
Yes. 
3. In what amount, if any, did you assess the 
damages to be awarded the plaintiff? 
$100,000. 
4. If you have answered yes to Interrogatories 
1 or 2, did the fault of Ellerman Lines, Ltd. 
[Defendant}, and the City Line, Ltd., arise out 
of any failure on the part of Atlantic and Gulf 
Stevedores, Inc. [Employer}, to do its work in 
accordance with the contractual obligation? 
No. 
5. If you have ansv,rered yes to Interrogatory 
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No. 4 was Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc.'s 
[Employer J breach of this contract a substantial 
factor in bringing about the injuries to the plain-
tiff? 
No." 
Thereupon, the District Court entered judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, and in 
favor of the third party defendant against defendant 
on the claim of indemnity (a remarkable similarity 
in facts with the instant case) . The Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals, despite the findings of the jury, reversed 
the judgment in favor of the third party defendant, 
and the United States Supreme Court, on a petition 
for certiorari, held: 
"We might agree with the Court of Appeals 
had the question of fact been left to us. But 
neither we nor the Court of Appeals can rede-
termine facts found by the jury any more than 
the District Court can predetermine them. For 
the Seventh Amendment says that 'no fact tried 
by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law.' 
* * * 
'Ve cannot say that petitioner was liable as 
a matter of law nor that the trial judge in the 
charge to the jury omitted any ingredient from 
petitioner's contractual liability. Moreover, we 
cannot say that the jury's verdict was inconsis-
tent. The Court of Appeals said that the case 
of the respondents' negligence was established 
because ' ... the record affords ample basis for 
a jury fact-finding that ( 1) use of the bale hook 
method in the discharge of the burlap bales con-
15 
stituted negligence, and ( 2) that the injured 
longshoreman was not afforded a safe place to 
work.' 289 F.2d, p. 207. 
So far as we know the jury may have found 
respondents liable not on either of those two 
grounds but soley on a third, namely, because 
of defective bands-a matter which was covered 
by the charge to the jury on the issue of unsea-
worthiness, and properly so. 'Veyerhaeuser S.S. 
Co. v. N acirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 
567, 2 L ed 2d 491, 494, 78 S Ct 438. If that was 
the jury's view of the facts, then petitioner 
plainly would not be liable under its warranty. 
'Vhere there is a view of the case that makes the 
jury's answers to special interrogatories con· 
sistent, they must be resolved that way. For a 
search for one possible view of the case which 
will make the jury's finding inconsistent results 
in a collision with the Seventh Amendment. 
Arnold v. Panhandle & S. F. R. Co., 353 US 
360, I L ed 2d 889, 77 S Ct 840. Cf Dick v. 
New York Life Ins. Co., 359 US 437, 446, 3 
L ed 2d 935, 942, 79 S Ct 921. 
Reversed." 
The Utah courts have refused to apply a view of 
the case that makes the jury's answers to the special 
interrogatories consistent and resolve them in that man· 
ner, except to conclude that the jury might have found 
operator conduct to constitute the sole proximate cause 
of the accident. The jury found to the contrary, having 
found the defect and its non-discovery to be the proxi· 
mate cause of the accident. The result is that this court 
refuses to consider the findings of the jury and deprives 
plaintiffs of a jury trial. 
16 
True, the United States Supreme Court in the 
Ellerman case construes the Seventh Amendment, 
which deals with jury trials in Federal Courts, but the 
Seventh Amendment provides that a jury in a Federal 
Court shall be a "common law" jury. The juries in 
the Utah courts are "common law" juries as that term 
is known by the law, and there is no distinction in the 
federal or state courts as to when the court may dis-
regard the findings of the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the opm1on and 
substitute opinion of this court completely ignore the 
total findings of the jury, and that this results in de-
priving appellants of their right to a jury trial thereby 
violating the Due Process and Equal Protection of 
Law Clauses of the Utah and United States Consti-
tutions. It is further respectfully submitted that appel-
lants have been prejudiced by the procedural irregu-
larity discussed above, and that fair play entitles appel-
lants to a rehearing, and that the court should recon-
sider its opinions and vacate same. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Delbert M. Draper, Jr. 
Draper, Sandack & Saperstein 
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Dated: September 21, 1966. 
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